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Failure of Space Shuttle Orbiter
KSC	 I&ENG,RINGFIow Control Valve (FCV) Poppet
• During the ascent of Endeavour (OV-105) on Space Shuttle mission
STS-126, the main propulsion system (MPS) engine #2 GH2 flow
control valve (FCV) appeared to make an un-commanded transition
from the low-flow to high-flow position
— This anomaly did not impact mission success
Post-mission disassembly of the FCV revealed that the poppet
was fractured and acrescent-shaped piece was missing
2
Ks	 GH  Flow Control Valve FCVc ^2
EN ^^ RING
• One FCV per main engine
— Controls the flow of G1-12 pressurant to the external tank (ET)
— Two positions: low and high flow
— Operating pressure is approximately 3400 psig
• Poppet is made from CRES 440A
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KSCENGllE RING FCV Poppet ia
"Barrel" or "spool"
"Flow flange", a.k.a, "downstream flange", or simply "the flange"
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roppet fracture surface exhibited five (5) distinct zones:
- Zones 1 & 2: Initial "thumbnails"
- Zone 3's (2): Circumferential propagation
- Zone 4 & 5: Propagation through the flange and final fracture
• Fracture initiation occurred at middle of the body-to-flange radius and
primarily propagated circumferentially along the radius, then through the
flange thickness
- The general plane of the fracture was -45 0
 from the flange face
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Zones 1 & 2: Initial thumbnails
Fracture initiated
on two planes
along the radius
surface, then
merged together
into one plane
Zone 1: 0.011 x 0.043 inch
Zone 2: 0.026 x 0.133 inch
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• Scanning electron
fractography revealed:
• small, semi-planar areas
• rounded ridges
• exposed carbide particles,
• "divots", which presumably
resulted from spherical
carbides being pulled out
(i.e., carbide decohesion).
• No substantial secondary
or intergranular cracking
• No striations
A. Large
blocky carbide
typical of
CRIES 440
Zone 2: Outer thumbnail•KSC
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• In Zone 2, the fracture propagated on a less torturous path, exhibiting larger
"semi-planar" regions, consisted with the smooth, shiny optical appearance.
Otherwise, the features were fairly consistent with that of Zone 1.
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• From the thumbnails, the fracture propagated circumferentially along the
radius, not penetrating further into the flange thickness
• The topography of the fracture surface in the Zone 3 wings was similar to
that of Zone 1
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• The"fracture surface increased in general roughness in Zone 4
— Exhibited some secondary cracking
— Sharper, more angular features
• Fracture toughness testing of 440A at NASA-MSFC in a 3400 psig GH 2
 environment
clearly demonstrated that the features of Zone 4 were consistent with a sustained
load cracking mechanism
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The Zone
exhibited
"corners"
fracture
surface typical of final,
rap id overload
Primarily dimpled
rupture
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• Investigation concluded that the poppet failed due to fatigue
cracking that, most likely, occurred under changing loading
conditions, explaining the multiple zones observed
— Comparison of the various zones with fracture surfaces
generated by testing specimens in GH 2
 at MSFC indicated that
the cracks most likely initiated in a hydrogen environment
— These comparisons also revealed that the crack propagation
through the flange wall (Zone 4) was primarily driven by a
sustained load (mean stress) cracking mechanism in GH2
• No evidence of a defect was found that would explain the failure,
such as corrosion, a raw material flaw, or other anomaly
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• At the time the failure occurred, there was no known cyclic loading
of the poppet to explain the fatigue failure
— Also unknown was whether the fracture surfaces indicated a
high cycle fatigue mechanism consistent with flow-induced
vibration or a low cycle mechanism consistent with poppet
actuation (translation from low to high flow)
• A test program was conducted using obsolete poppets that were no
longer in service
— To acquire results quickly, the testing was performed with
mechanical loading of the flange, as opposed to performing a
series of flow tests
— A hook mechanism was used to pull on the poppet flange,
loading the radius in tension
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Test Results
-a.,
•	 he test results were very inconsistent, with lighter test
loads resulting in relatively fast failures
• More importantly, the "quick failures" exhibited the
thumbnail zones characteristic of the original failure
• Conclusion: The thumbnail cracks were pre-existing
SIN / Test Load (Ibs.)
@ R = 0.1
Cycles to
Failure
Thumbnail
530-01 First 150 lbs
250 lbs
1 M cycles
12K cycles
No
530-06 175 lbs 3600 cycles Yes (2)
530-01 Second 175 lbs 1684 cycles Yes (2)
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The thumbnail zones of
the test articles exhibited
fracture features that
were very similar to that
of the original failure
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• The discovery of pre-existing thumbnail cracks in the previous, now
"retired" flight hardware used for the fatigue testing indicated that
poppet cracking was a generic problem that had existed for the life
of the Shuttle program
• Subsequently, the program developed an eddy current (EC)
technique that was capable of reliably detecting these small, very
tight cracks
— EC detected cracks in 10 of 15 retired flight poppets
• Before the next mission after STS-126 could be flown, the integrity
of the current flight hardware required verification
EC inspections found 4 of 13 cracked
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• With so few missions remaining for the Shuttle program, there is
insufficient time to implement a permanent corrective action, so the
program is mitigating the risk of using the current flight poppets by
monitoring their "health" with EC inspections
— Each poppet is inspected after every mission
— After GN2 flow balance testing at the valve vendor
— After GH2 flow calibration and mission duty cycle (MDC) testing
at WSTF
• To date, a total of 12 current flight units, including the original failure,
have been found cracked by EC inspections
— All cracks subsequently verified by SEM examination
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• Of the current flight hardware poppets found cracked, five of them
were actually new poppets, pulled from spares, that were to replace
poppets that had been found to be cracked
— In each case, the EC inspections after MDC testing at WSTF
detected the cracks
• EC inspections prior to MDC did not detect the cracks
• Fractography of two zero-flight poppets found that the fractures were
quite similar to the original failure and the cracked obsolete (fatigue
test) poppets
20
KSC ^'	 ConclusionsENG ;E RING
• The poppet failed during STS-126 due to fatigue cracking that most
likely was initiated during MDC ground- testing
• This failure ultimately led to the discovery that the cracking problem
was a generic issue effecting numerous poppets throughout the
Shuttle program's history
• This presentation has focused on the laboratory analysis of the
failed hardware, but this analysis was only one aspect of a
comprehensive failure investigation. One critical aspect of the
overall investigation was modeling of the fluid flow through this valve
to determine the possible sources of cyclic loading
— This work has led to the conclusion that the poppets are failing
due to flow-induced vibration
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